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Synopsis
This Report summarizes the results of the Center of Fiscal Policy Project “Accounting
of Extra-budgetary Revenues of Government Agencies”. The Report gives a description of
how extra-budgetary revenues of government agencies are currently generated and used,
making a case for amending the existing legislation insofar as it concerns interpretation of the
term “government agency”. It also provides reasoning in support of proposals on broadening
the definition of the budget system and on issues of accounting of extra-budgetary resources of
agencies funded from the federal budget.
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Introduction 
The Concept of public fiscal policy in the field of expenditures developed by the
Russian Ministry of Finance in accordance with the Plan of Actions of the Russian
Government in the area of social policy and economy upgrading in 2000-01 places special
emphasis on reforming the system of state and municipal unitary, fiscal and publicly-owned
enterprises and government agencies as a key avenue for raising the efficiency of budget
expenditures. The idea of the reform is to cut down the public sector while making it more
efficient. In particular, the Concept provides for a voluntary movement of some of the
government agencies to the private sector in parallel with a phased reduction in financing
provided to them by the government. Primary candidates should be healthcare, education and
other government agencies generating substantial extra-budgetary revenues. Presumably, these
will compete with other similar institutions for obtaining public financing and bear full
responsibility for fulfillment of their obligations. All other government agencies in the long run
are supposed to lose their financial autonomy and be funded from the Budget in accordance
with a strictly specified smeta (budget).
The subject of this study is the current legislation of the Russian Federation defining
what “government agency” should be understood to mean, how it should be financed, what
procedure should apply to accounting of extra-budgetary revenues of government agencies;
and an overview of foreign practices, sources and purposes of spending of revenues raised
from extra-budgetary sources by Russian government agencies.
The study seeks to develop a general concept of integrating government agencies into
Russia’s regular budgetary system and budget process and work out recommendations for
improving legislation in the field of accounting of extra-budgetary resources of government
agencies. 
The study is based on the analysis of the effective legislation in the field of accounting
of extra-budgetary revenues of government agencies, and data contained in accounting
statements and information of Federal Treasury branches as well as on foreign experience in
the field of extra-budgetary revenue accounting of state-owned institutions. The study does not
aim to analyze the way government extra-budgetary social funds are generated and used,
although it does provide an overview of how revenues of such funds are accounted for as part
of revenues of the budget systems of a number of countries. In view of objective limitations
imposed by the time and information available for this study the consultants did not seek to
analyze tendencies underlying formation of extra-budgetary revenues of government agencies
and motives driving budgetary asset managers and government agencies to raise extra-
budgetary revenues. Proposals on how to reform extra-budgetary revenue accounting of
government agencies set out in the Report are based on its authors’ concept of including
government agencies into the group of institutions whose revenues and expenditures are
integrated into the budget process equally with other budget revenues and expenditures. The
proposed Concept, if implemented, makes it possible to combine сметное financing of the said
agencies with enabling them to raise additional revenues from provision of paid services. The
authors proceed from the assumption that material constraints imposed by the government on
institutions’ choices about the use of funds from extra-budgetary sources, close state control
over where such funds come from and what they are spent on, and limitations on extra-
budgetary revenue totals would, on the one hand, make government agencies capable of
fending for themselves voluntarily relinquish their status of government agencies, and on the
other, enhance state budget protection from threat of subsidiary liability for obligations of
government agencies.
 
1. Extra-budgetary revenues: definitions and accounting practice
Government agency, revenue and expense budget (smeta), and Extra-budgetary
revenues as defined in the current legislation
Government Agency
In the Civil Code an agency is defined as an organization set up, and financed in full
or in part, by an owner for performing managerial, social and cultural or other functions not
for profit. The legislation leaves room for a law or other legal acts to specify legal status to
be accorded to certain types of government and other institutions (Article 120 of the
Russian Civil Code).
An agency is the only type of non-profit organizations that is not an owner of its
property. Agencies include bodies of state and municipal administration, and training,
education, healthcare, culture, sports, social protection and other institutions. This diversity has
prevented the Civil Code from specifying any particular titles for their foundation documents.
Hence, it may be either a charter or a general regulation for the establishment of an agency of a
given type or a statute of a particular organization approved by the owner. 
Not being an owner of its assets, an institution has a right of day-to-day
management of assets transferred thereto, although to a limited extent. Commonly,
foundation documents (Statutes) of government agencies have no provisions for such agencies
to engage in entrepreneurial activities except in special cases expressly provided for therein.
Nor do they provide for that assets transferred to them for operational management may be
used in entrepreneurial activities. 
The Civil Code also establishes that an institution shall be liable within the limits of
financial resources available to it. Where an institution lacks sufficient funds to discharge its
obligations the owner will have to assume subsidiary liability therefor.
The Budget Code defines a government agency as an organization set up by organs of
state power of the Russian Federation for performing managerial, social and cultural, scientific
and technological, or other non-profit functions, and funded from an appropriate budget or
the budget of a state extra-budgetary fund based on the revenue and expense budget (Article
161 of the Russian Budget Code).
Revenue and Expense Budget
The legislation currently in force provides no definition for the term ‘smeta’ although
the concept has been very widely used. For want of an official definition, given below is the
one applied under the planned economy system (Box 1). 
 Box 1
‘Government agency budget (smeta)’ shall be understood to mean the main planning document
used for funding of agencies and organizations in the non-material sector from the USSR budget. It
establishes the level, purpose and quarterly distribution of budgetary appropriations for all expenditures
of a given institution. Upon approval in accordance with the established procedure the g.a.b. serves as a
basis for spending of the funds allocated from the Budget. As opposed to other financial plans made in
the form of a balance of revenues and expenditures ‘smeta’ is a plan of expenses and reflects a
unilateral nature of relations with the budget of agencies financed on the basis of a ‘smeta’. Revenues
accruing to some of the government agencies from production and other types of activities are normally
accounted for in the revenue and expenditure ‘smeta’ of special receipts and shall be used in accordance
with a special procedure. The g.a.b. shall include total costs required for a normal operation of an
agency regardless of whether special and other off-budget receipts are available to cover them.
Expenses of government agencies are calculated from their operation and production figures
(infrastructure facilities and their client population), based on targets of the plan of economic and social
development of an administrative and territorial unit and expenditure norms established per unit or by
cost element. The g.b.a. shall not include costs of actions not provided for in the plan. Expenditures in
the ‘smeta’ are broken down into groups based on the purpose of spending in accordance with items,
sections, and paragraphs of the budget classification.
Dictionary of Financial and Monetary Terms in three volumes. Moscow, “Finansi i Statistika”
(Finances and Statistics) Publishing House, 1988.
It is much in the same sense that the term ‘smeta’ is used today. Yet, the following parts
of the foregoing definition are to be acknowledged outdated and invalid: where it reads that the
‘smeta’ shall include total costs required for a normal operation of an agency, and where it
requires that revenues accruing to certain agencies on top of budgeted financing should be
accounted for in a ‘smeta’ of revenues and expenditures separately from budgeted financing
and that those revenues should be used in accordance with a specially prescribed order. As can
be inferred from the definition given to ‘government agency’ in the Russian Budget Code, the
government agency budget (smeta) should include not only expenditures but also revenues of
such an agency. 
The Budget Code establishes that a government agency shall be funded on the basis of
a revenue and expense budget that is supposed to reflect all agency’s receipts from the Budget
and state extra-budgetary funds as well as from business-like activities, including revenues
from paid services, and other revenues received from use(s) of state or municipal property
assigned to the institution for operational management, and other activities.  (Article 161 of the
Budget Code). It should be noted in passing that the above definition refers to a single budget
(smeta) reflecting all revenues of a government agency.
Extra-budgetary Revenues
As can be inferred, government financing is not the only revenue source of government
agencies. The owner may allow them to raise extra revenues from authorized activities.
The owner (body of government) should specify such authorized activities in the
agency’s foundation documents, as is mentioned, inter alia, in the Civil Code (Article 298): 
“If the foundation documents authorize an agency to engage in income-generating activities,
revenues arising from such activities and assets acquired with such revenues should be placed at
agency’s disposal and accounted for in separate books”. 
Whether a government agency should make a separate expense budget for each type of
revenues or have a single expense budget and whether it should have discretion over use of its
extra-budgetary revenues has not been conclusively established in the current legislation. As
will be shown later (Section 5: Revenue accounting system of government agencies), the
system of qualification of government agency revenues currently in use raises a lot of
important problems. However, in this context it is important for us to just note that the
legislation currently in force allows a government agency to have a single budget, although in
practice for tax purposes they normally make two budgets to keep track each of budgetary and
extra-budgetary revenues and what they are spent on.
Existing system of control over extra-budgetary revenues of 
Government agencies 
What makes the problem of establishing control over extra-budgetary revenues of
government agencies so urgent is the size of public infrastructure. According to the Russian
Ministry of State Property at present there are 33,826 federal government agencies in Russia. 
General goals, objectives and principles of management of government agencies in the
Russian Federation are set out in the Concept of management of state property and
privatization in the Russian Federation approved by the Russian Government in Resolution N
1024 of September 9, 1999 (as amended in Russian Government Resolution N 903 of
November 29, 2000). 
The Concept establishes, amongst others, the need for reviewing the priorities in the
field of disposal of state property, and toughening government oversight and regulation in
the public sector of the economy. A stronger role of the State in regulation of the economy is
not considered therein as a growth of state-owned assets in numbers, but implies higher
efficiency of management of enterprises and agencies in Russia.
The system currently employed by the State to control government agencies has many
material disadvantages not only preventing it from keeping accurate accounts of revenues and
expenditures of, but also enabling, government agencies to act contrary to owner’s interests. 
To name just a few, under the current legislation the system of government control over
extra-budgetary resources of federal government agencies boils down to control exercised by
general managers over compilation, and routine and follow-up control exercised by the Federal
Treasury over execution of budgets (smeta). But even leaving aside the unfinished transition of
federal government agencies to the treasury system,1 the regulatory framework governing the
latter is by itself imperfect in that it allows government agencies to raise and spend revenues
                                                
1 Pursuant to Russian Government Resolution N1001 of August 22, 1998 “On measures for transferring
accounts of organizations financed from the federal budget for accounting of receipts from entrepreneurial and
other income-generating activities to Federal Treasury organs” organizations financed from the federal budget
were to cause before January 1, 1999 closure of accounts maintained in the Central Bank of Russia agencies and
credit institutions by organizations financed from the federal budget for accounting of receipts from income-
generating activities and transfer of the balances of those accounts to their personal accounts opened in organs of
the Federal Treasury of the RF Ministry of Finance. However, the above transfer has not been completed so far.
from extra-budgetary sources without adequately reflecting the flow of funds thus raised on
their personal Treasury accounts. 
For example, institutions today don’t have to seek owner’s approval for raising debt to
finance their activities or make use (including by way of lease or sublease) of thereto assigned
state property for generating profits without sharing or reporting earnings thus made with or to
the owner.
Contrary to the legislation currently in force, sector federal bodies of the executive
branch of government keep no track of immovable property assigned to subordinate
government agencies, nor do they take measures to ensure more efficient use of buildings and
structures.
In experts’ assessment, earnings from lease of federal property amount to over 90
percent of total extra-budgetary revenues of government agencies while actual amounts paid
into the federal budget out of earnings from state property lease are substantially below that
figure. For example, in the federal budget for 2001 total revenues from lease of federal
property, with allowance made for privileged categories of book-holders, are estimated in the
amount of RUR 2.4 bln. of which the federal budget will receive RUR 0.6 bln., whereas RUR
1.8 bln. worth of rental payments, although accounted for in the federal budget, will be retained
by book-holders.2 If we are to solve problems related to management of government agencies
there needs to be in place a system of legislative norms and rules that would ensure more
efficient operation of government agencies in the interests of both owners and consumers of
public services.
The foregoing rules should include a procedure for formation and use of extra-
budgetary resources received by government agencies. Such a procedure should allow, on
the one hand, to define a scope of authority of government agencies in raising and disposing of
extra-budgetary revenues, and on the other, to create a mechanism of effective supervision of
their use. It shall, in the first place, ensure a transparent reflection of all extra-budgetary
revenues of government agencies in everyday accounting and periodical reports. Such an
accounting and reporting system, if established, will make it possible to identify redundant
assets or those that fail to be used or are being used for unintended purposes and reveal
revenues derived by a government agency from activities outside the scope of its specific
activities identified as the purpose of the government agency. 
The main problem here is that the legislation provides no straightforward guide to
what the status of extra-budgetary revenues of government agencies is. In particular, it is
debatable whether these revenues should be treated as an incremental financing of the agency’s
core (main) activities or as earmarked funds to be used, say, only for the development of
agency’s material resources and technical facilities (as opposed to wages and salaries), or as
earnings from business-like activities that should be subject to taxes, and whether limitations
are to be imposed on such business-like activities (for them not to exceed, for example, 25
percent of the core activities). The current legislation gives no straightforward answers to the
                                                
2 In 1999 the total space of federal non-residential housing stock was 337 MM sq. m that generated rental
income of RUR 95.5 MM, RUR 223 MM, RUR305 MM, and RUR 466.6 MM in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998
respectively (in 1998 prices). In 2000 federal budget revenues from lease of federal property by research
institutions, and healthcare, education and culture agencies amounted to RUR 2345.6 MM.
Privileges granted by a number of laws vis-à-vis rental payment transfers to the federal budget are
estimated at RUR 1,150 MM.
questions described above, this being unfortunate in that such answers are critical for extra-
budgetary resource management and the system of management of government agencies in
general.
In the absence of a clear answer as to what the status of extra-budgetary revenues of
government agencies should be the system of management of extra-budgetary resources of
government agencies, although by and large existent, with each of its components developing
in one way or another, remains overall inefficient.  
It stands to reason that before reforming the system of management of government
agencies one needs to clarify their goals and objectives and define more exactly the status the
agencies themselves and extra-budgetary revenues they generate, should have. Only then will it
be possible to develop a system of legislative norms and rules capable of ensuring an efficient
operation of the overall system of government agencies.
2. Goals and Objectives of Government Agencies
The Concept of public fiscal policy in the field of expenditures developed by the
Russian Ministry of Finance places special emphasis on reforming the system of state and
municipal unitary, fiscal and publicly-owned enterprises and government agencies as a key
avenue for raising the efficiency of budget expenditures. Inter alia, it provides for a voluntary
movement of some of the government agencies to the private sector in parallel with a phased
reduction in financing provided to them by the government. 
The way the problem is looked at suggests that at least some of the government
agencies may fend for themselves, and, in particular, not only without financial support from
the Budget but also without government oversight. This raises the question as to whether
government agencies should be given a right to choose a status for themselves. Is there a risk
that, if “set free”, a government agency will turn to performance of commercial functions and,
as it happens, abandon socially important activities it has originally been created for? Or in
other words, if a government agency can successfully exist as a non-governmental sector
organization why is this niche in the non-governmental (market) sector still empty and no
similar organizations have been created so far under the impact of market forces? Are there
valid reasons for the government to intervene in the delivery of a particular service or should
the market be given complete control over it?
There are in effect different ‘grades’ of government interventions in provision of
socially important services.3 Those services can be provided by (1) public organizations, (2)
organizations of non-governmental (private) sector under state orders (on a contractual basis)
                                                
3 The term “socially important” services as applied to services delivered by government agencies is not
very appropriate since any services provided on commercial terms and conditions should also be acknowledged
important from the social perspective, this being strongly supported by clients’ willingness to pay for them. Social
importance of a service is not a valid ground for government intervention (being a necessary but not sufficient
requirement therefor). Spillovers that leave the society better of but are not covered by a private service price do
not make a strong enough case for such interference either, since consumption of any private services, products or
goods is in one way or another creating beneficial or detrimental effects for the society. However, some services
are nevertheless successfully provided by the private sector while others are traditionally considered to be public
ones. That government agencies have to be created because of market failures is not always a convincing
argument either, since very often market failures are caused by the monopoly position of government agencies in
a sector. 
or (3) private sector organizations regulated by the government (in the form of licensing). The
status currently enjoyed by government agencies is one by which they are guaranteed full or
partial funding from the Budget. However, it has to be decided whether this way of provision
of socially important services is the most cost-effective from the Budget perspective and
whether contract awards through bidding without differentiating between government agencies
and private sector institutions are a better and cheaper way of doing it. If what is suggested
here can work for at least some of the services, agencies engaged in certain types of activities
won’t have to move to the private sector neither voluntarily nor compulsorily, just because it is
public services, not public institutions that will be funded from the Budget. This will change
“rules of the game” in the market for all participants of whatever ownership or legal form. As
this happens, rather than decreasing, the level of funding of public services may even go up.
However, guaranteed funding of government agencies will give way to awards of contracts
through bidding procedures, with no distinctions to be made between state and private
institutions, at least from financing standpoint. 
In addition to partial government financing there is another good reason for government
agencies to stick to their status: tax privileges. A more detailed description of tax benefits and
proposals on modification of the existing system of tax privileges for government agencies will
be given later in the report (refer to Section “Qualification of revenues for tax purposes”).
Meanwhile it will suffice to say that if “rules of the game” change in the proposed vein it is
important to decide whether tax privileges should continue to apply to government agencies’
activities or be granted for specific functions acknowledged by the government to be of social
importance, regardless of the ownership form of their provider.
Although common sense suggests that public financing should be provided, either
directly or indirectly, to support social services or functions, rather than government agencies it
has long become a tradition to give state support not only and not so much to residents that
consume government services but to government agencies and their employees. Apparently,
we are dealing here with a substitution of the purpose for which government agencies are
created. In any case, it has become quite common for low wages for teachers to be used as
nearly a principal argument for increasing the level of financing of education. And this just
starts the list: the need for more funds for healthcare is substantiated by low wages of medical
personnel; low wages for researches are used to make a case for higher level of funding of
R&D. Wages for government agency employees being indeed low, the budgetary statistics
nevertheless reflects spending on wages only out of directly transferred government funds,
failing to capture fringe benefits paid to government agency staff out of extra-budgetary
revenues. But more importantly, we are confronted here with a substitution of the purpose for
which government agencies are created. For example, one must not rule out a possibility that
the quality of medical services would have improved, if the share of subsidized medicines or
medicines used for in-patients in total spending on healthcare increased. However, the Budget
Code principle whereby expenditures having to do with ensuring minimum public standards
are to be funded in the first place is commonly considered to be referring to priority financing
of wages for government agency personnel.4
At present the purpose of spending on maintenance of government agencies is hence
twofold: delivery of socially important services to the population and provision of social
support to public sector employees. For example, to equalize per capita budget revenues across
                                                
4 It is likely to be due to that the Uniform Schedule of Wages for public sector employees alongside
monthly child benefits is almost the only government minimum social standard currently in force. 
localities, many subjects of the Russian Federation rather than equalizing budget resources
available per resident in each locality are striving to achieve equalization of budget resources
per public sector employee. In other words, they are calculating minimum budgets of the
localities based on the number of physical facilities available within the locality, not the
number of clients for local government services. Clearly, there is a relationship between the
number of clients and the number of public sector employees. However, in their desire to
support medical doctors, teachers and other representatives of public sector professions
regional authorities of the Russian Federation often go too far and keep on spending substantial
amounts on maintenance of social infrastructure in localities where per capita level of public
services provision is excessively high or act in disregard of population needs for public
services in cases where a necessary municipal facility is non-existent in a locality. 
A switch over from financing of institutions to financing of functions should be
organized in such a way as to make it as painless for government agency employees as
possible. Of certain avail can be experience of foreign countries that try to avoid lays-off in the
public sector, and where there is a need to cut down the number of employees or shut down
government agencies they impose bans on employment of new workmen. However, the
discussion of how the switch over mentioned above may be achieved is beyond the scope of
this overview. For one to be able to plan any actions to straighten out the existing system of
government agencies one should at least know how many they are, what functions they
perform and how much money they have. Therefore, the first thing to do should be an
inventory of government agencies and organizations to be followed by establishment of a
stringent system of accounting of extra-budgetary revenues of existing government agencies
and organizations.
3. Proposed Concept of Status of Government Agencies and Their Extra-
budgetary Revenues 
One cannot develop a concept of law-based solution of the problem of extra-budgetary
resources of government agencies under conditions of transition to the market economy
without first resolving the following issues: 
1. May government agencies provide paid services as their core or one of the key
activities at prices close to market ones (or should they be deprived of the right to
charge non-subsidized prices for their services)?  Can government agencies be fully
self-paying and generate planned profits?
2. May a government agency engage in profits/income generating activities outside the
purpose for which it has been created? 
Can a government agency be self-paying? The answer to this question that suggests
itself is “yes”. Government agencies can provide paid services as their core activities and, as a
matter of fact, be self-paying. The following arguments can be possibly adduced against it: (1)
If a government agency is self-paying wouldn’t it be appropriate to make it private or remove it
from the public sector in any other way? (2) Wouldn’t self-sufficiency of government agencies
run counter to the definition given to them in the Civil Code whereby an owner is to finance a
government agency in full or at least in part, or to the Budget Code definition requiring
government agencies to be financed from the Budget on the basis of revenue and expense
budgets?  
(1). In addition to purely economic reasons there are also political considerations in
support of government agencies going private or remaining as part of the public sector. A
detailed review of political reasons that may weaken the case for privatization of self-paying
government agencies goes beyond the scope of this study. We’ll mention just a few. Some
government agencies (such as culture institutions) may, for instance, be a matter of pride for
the founding government, and their transfer to the private sector would be objectionable in
view of their important social role. Furthermore, some of the functions such as official
registration, even if performed for a fee, may not become private.
(2). A government agency is a property of its founder, i.e. of a founding body of state
power. From this perspective any income raised by a government agency should be treated as
constituting government revenues. For example, in the event of liquidation of a government
agency the government as an owner shall be entitled to consolidate in the budget whatever
assets left after payments to creditors. Hence, ‘off-budget’ revenues of government agencies
are, as a matter of fact, a form of government financing, and hence “break-even” government
agencies are well suited for inclusion in the category of “agencies financed from the Budget”.  
May a government agency engage in profits/income generating activities outside the
purpose for which it has been created? A key distinction between government agencies as
non-profit organizations and state unitary enterprises governed by the principles very similar to
those of profit enterprises lies in that an agency’s owner bears subsidiary liability for its
obligations. It necessitates the following restrictions: (1) A budget institution shall not be
entitled to borrow funds (other than loans extended by the founder), neither in the form of
bonds or accounts payable or loans from commercial banks; debt issuance should become an
exclusive prerogative of the legislative branch of government. (2) A budget institution shall
not be entitled to engage in entrepreneurial activities, defined in the Civil Code as activities
undertaken at one’s risk, since by definition a government agency, with its founder bearing
subsidiary liability for its obligations, can run no risk of its own. (3) Discretion of government
agencies over extra-budgetary receipts shall be limited by a budget (smeta) approved in
accordance with the established procedure or general rules of spending of extra-
budgetary resources to be established for more than just a fiscal year. In the latter case where
a budget institution is supposed to be given fairly wide discretion over spending of extra-
budgetary receipts, it will be reasonable to establish an overall limit on extra-budgetary
revenues, with surplus to be centralized in the Budget.5 The limit may be set high enough not
to dull the incentives for a government agency to raise funds from extra-budgetary sources. (4)
A government agency shall maintain no accounts in commercial banks. All its revenues and
expenditures shall be run through the Treasury under and with its founder control and consent.
Alternatives of government control over revenues and expenses of government
agencies. The latter statement concerning government oversight lends itself to different
interpretations ranging from that government agencies should be barred from having extra-
budgetary revenues to that they should be granted a fairly high degree of autonomy in using
extra-budgetary receipts. In theory there can be at least three alternatives of such oversight
differing in the degree of autonomy granted to a government agency (in all three the revenues
                                                
5 Similar restrictions are imposed in other countries. For more details see the Section on International
Experience.
and expenditures of all government agencies are supposed to be accounted for through the
Treasury system). The review of international experience in accounting of government
agencies’ own revenues (see next Section) has shown that all three alternatives are in one way
or another used in practice by other countries.
(1). Сметное financing provided exclusively from the Budget. Payments for services
provided by (or any other extra-budgetary revenues such as voluntary donations arising from
the activities of) a government agency shall be centralized in the Budget. Government agencies
have no accounts of their own for accounting of their extra-budgetary revenues and are funded
only by annual appropriations. Funds earned by a government agency require appropriation by
a legislative organ that may appropriate them for support of the agency itself or other purposes
or pay back to the payer (in case of donations for a particular government agency). For
example, neither courts nor the army should have extra-budgetary revenues.
 (2). Financing of a government agency based on two or more budgets (smeta). Payments
for services delivered by a public institution are considered to be founder’s “special” income.
What makes it “special” is that it accrues from fees collected from particular payers for a
delivery of particular services rather than from taxes. Consumers who pay for a particular
service have a right to expect these receipts to be in full or in most part spent on production of
a particular service rather than on other spending functions of the government in general or a
government agency in particular, since a service consumer has already paid for the said other
purposes of spending as a taxpayer. Having collected fees for a service a government agency in
effect entered into contractual relations with the service consumers. Thus, the government shall
not be entitled to centralize the receipts in the budget and dispose of them at its own discretion.
Therefore, if it allows a government agency to collect payments for production of services, the
State shall allow the agency to spend all or part of collections on income-generating activities.
To this end the State may allow a government agency to open up an account in the Treasury for
accounting of extra-budgetary revenues, and specify a procedure for and purposes of spending
thereof. By the same token, the founder may disallow a government agency to spend extra-
budgetary receipts on anything except income-generating activities. Or it may set other
purposes of spending by stipulating that extra-budgetary revenues should be used for the
development of agency’s technical facilities and material resources rather than for wages and
salaries, or the other way round. Thus, the public institution has two accounts opened for it in
the Treasury: one for accounting of government financing and the other – for accounting of
extra-budgetary revenues. For each account there should be a separate expense budget or an
indication of purposes of spending.
(3) A single budget (smeta) financed at the expense of budgetary and extra-budgetary
receipts (possibly in combination with a separate budget (smeta) for special sources of
revenues and purposes of spending). There are cases where fees collected by a government
agency are spent on maintenance of the entire agency rather than on just one of its activities
because the line of activities generating income is inseparable from the rest of the agency’s
business. In those cases it makes no sense or even impossible to have two separate budgets for
accounting of government financing and extra-budgetary revenues. It would be more
reasonable to treat extra-budgetary revenues as additional appropriations of on-budgetary
revenues that would require an approval in accordance with the established procedure. That
such appropriations are “additional”, i.e. go on top of direct government financing should not
be understood to mean that unlike other appropriations approved at the time of adoption of the
budget, they should be approved during a fiscal year. If a source of extra-budgetary revenues is
stable (which is very likely where a revenue source is connected with the agency’s core
activities, since government agencies, as their nature suggests, are not supposed to strive for
casual earnings, although one can never exclude the possibility of incidental revenues as well
as incidental expenditures) receipts therefrom can be planned in advance and approved as an
“extra-budgetary appropriation” as part of the annual appropriations process. If a revenue
source is unstable or haphazard making it impossible to approve revenues therefrom as an
“extra-budgetary appropriation”, an appropriate decision will have to be made during a fiscal
year. International experience bears witness to that such unstable revenues can be posted to the
agency’s personal account in the Treasury as negative expenditures. In the latter case there is
no need to review appropriations already made since “negative expenditures” are offset against
expenditures and don’t increase revenues (i.e. appropriations). However, practicability as well
as reasonability of the above approach is questionable as it may weaken control over a
government agency’s income, small and unstable as it is.
Accounting of extra-budgetary revenues in the budgetary process
All the foregoing options of budgeted (сметное) financing of government agencies
with allowance made for extra-budgetary revenues emphasize the need to clarify the terms of
“budget”, and “budgetary system”. The Budget Code defines Russian budgetary system as a
combination of federal budget, regional budgets, local budgets and state EBF budgets
(Article 6). In other words, the budgetary system represents a combination of funds, the federal
budget being one of them. The definition refers also to budgets of different levels and EBFs,
but contains no mentioning of budgetary funds. As there is no readily available definition of a
budgetary fund that can be proposed here we’ll try to explain what it means on the intuitive
level. The bulk of the budget of any government level is represented by a cash fund accruing
from revenues not earmarked for specific expenditure purposes that are annually determined by
the legislative body and are covered by budgetary appropriations. In addition to such revenues
that are not earmarked for a particular purpose of spending, the government may also have
earmarked revenues to finance specific expenditures. Hence, the government does not have the
same degree of discretion over such funds as it has over non-earmarked revenues, although the
extent of the government’s control over such funds is fairly important, and spending decisions
on both types of assets at the end of the day are taken in the integral (common) context. From
this perspective, a budget in our conventional (narrow) sense is just one of the budgetary funds
(albeit the most important one), while the extended notion of the budget may also include other
budgetary funds. The “separate nature” of these funds manifests itself in that the they have
“own” earmarked sources of revenue, that become revenues of the extended budget not
directly, but through relevant budgetary funds. Each of them, including the budget itself,
possesses its own internally balanced system of accounts. 
Therefore a budget (whether federal, regional or local) in our conventional
understanding should be treated as a fund of the budgetary system, which is financed by
general (not earmarked) taxes while spending of its proceeds is not regulated. Extra-budgetary
assets (funds, revenues) of public institutions represent the same funds of the budgetary system
as the budget, but they have their own (earmarked) sources of revenues and their proceeds are
spent for specific purposes. In particular, a public agency may exist solely on account of its
revenues, for example, by collecting fees for provided services, while remaining a government
agency. Revenues and expenditures of such institution are revenues and expenditures of the
budgetary system; however, they should be accounted for not as a portion of revenues and
expenditures of the main budgetary fund, but as a portion of revenues and expenditures of a
special budgetary fund, i.e. the fund of a specific agency.
Naturally, one may ask here whether this accounting system would not be too
cumbersome. Indeed, if all thirty thousand government agencies at the federal level were
classified as budgetary funds, then the budgetary documents would become boundless.
However such level of detail is not required for filing budgetary documents (draft federal
budget, report on execution of the federal budget). It is enough to break all government
agencies into sector categories – for example “Funds of Medicare government agencies”,
Funds of cultural government agencies” etc., or to introduce several types of funds (for
example, self-sufficient, or “business-like”, and ordinary subsidized funds). 
Besides, budgetary classification should be supplemented with classification of
revenues and expenditures of government agencies. In particular, it should be supplemented
with classification of revenues and expenditures of government agencies. Funds of government
agencies could be reflected in the budget by sector – i.e. budget allocations to sector ministries
should be recorded alongside with allocations (budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues) for
financing subordinate government agencies, i.e. agencies in respect to which those ministries
act as main managers of account. Direct recipients of monies from the federal budget (and
possibly, largest government agencies) may be reflected in the budget separately from sector
funds. Thus, for example, Moscow State University is a typical government agency that may
be treated for budgetary purposes as a separate fund. Apparently, all of the foregoing will
require updating of the budget classification by sector. 
The boundaries of public finance in the Russian Federation are now blurred. Inventory
of government agencies and government-owned companies has not been completed, with no
division of assets and revenues generated by such assets made so far between different levels
of governments and fiscal system. Given below is a description of two currently existing
practical approaches to definition of public finance and management of government-owned
assets (Boxes 2 and 3). 
Box 2
Federal Government Asset Complexes
In 1998 state-owned unitary company (ГУП УА) for management of Medical Center’s assets
was established under the RF President’s Administration. Since 1998 ГУП УА has launched 34 unique
structures, which are called federal government asset complexes (ФГИК) under the President’s
Administration. A feasibility study for reorganization of Joint-stock Company Rostovugol (Rostov coal
mining company) was submitted to the Government of Russia and the President’s Administration. For
this purpose private property, i.e. 12 mines and 31 entities of Rostovgol were to be transferred to the
Administration for temporary use. After becoming ФГИК, Rostovugol would obtain major tax benefits,
which are enjoyed by the Administration’s entities, and an estimated 4.4-times reduction of tax burden
will be achieved by such ФГИК vs. Rostovugol.
The Ministry of Energy also views the ФГИК concept as a productive one. Gennady Seleznev,
Speaker of the Duma, and Viktor Kazantsev, one of the special representatives of the President,
endorsed this approach in their letters to President Putin.    
On the contrary, the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade is of the opinion that such
legal status as ФГИК “does not fit in the legal framework provided by the Civil, Tax and Budget
Codes”. 
Mr. A. Danilov-Danilyan, Head of Economic Department under the President’s Administration,
emphasizes that “Before this year the corresponding item was recorded in the confidential section of the
budget". 
Advisors believe that the foregoing example features inadmissible blending of state
management and business functions.
Source: Vedomosty newspaper, 25 June 2001.
Box 3
Who owns historical and cultural monuments?
In 2001 the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Property of the Russian Federation
established the Agency for Management of Historical and Cultural Monuments. It is expected that the
Agency will manage ancient federal buildings in Moscow, lease out and sell such buildings and rip
profits. The primary objective of establishing such Agency is to identify owners of various assets.
Establishment of the Agency has already provoked a conflict with the Government and Mayor
of the City of Moscow. The Mayor in his letter addressed to Prime Minister Kasyanov stated that the
Agency strives for declaring Moscow monuments of federal (national) importance as belonging to the
federal government. The Mayor urges to set up a special commission, which would divide Moscow
monuments into Moscow and federal property. 
A year ago by approving the law «On Protection and Use of Real-estate Monuments of History
and Culture” the Capital speedily declared all architectural monuments in Moscow as belonging to the
City. However, the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation in its Regulation (# 3020 dated 27
December 1991) expressly ruled that sites of federal importance fall under federal ownership.
Therefore, Moscow laws on use of national heritage are in apparent conflict with federal laws and need
to be revised. If Moscow disagrees, then the federal government will be entitled to file a suit and the
capital will have to return to the federal budget large amounts of cash generated by illegal lease of
federal property.
Previously, top authorities of the country allowed Moscow to use federal assets as if they were
Moscow’s own property. Thus, organizations which are located on the sites of national monuments (and
these include GUM, TsUM, Gostiny Dvor) continue to pay rent to Moscow with the proceeds going to
the municipal budget, while pursuant to applicable laws the same should flow to the federal treasury. 
How much does the Capital of this country earn from federal monuments? Independent experts
speak of 1,723 historical and cultural real-estate monuments of federal importance in Moscow with the
total area of about 2.5 MM sq. m. Only 0.7 MM sq. m of these may generate any feasible revenues. The
government-approved average rent in Moscow is RUR1,500/sq. m per annum. As for commercial rates,
experts point at RUR6,000 sq. m. 
Under the first scenario Moscow collects annually about RUR1bn. Under the second scenario
the proceeds rise to RUR4.2 bn. On top of that, Moscow generates some income from lease and
privatization of local monuments. 
Last year the capital spent RUR1.8 bn on restoration of monuments, including RUR1.3bn
provided by investors and the federal budget (RUR67.5 MM). 
Consultants are of the opinion that revenues generated from use of federal property should flow
to the federal budget.
Source:  Moskovskie Novosty 12.06.2001.
Government agency or business entity?
Services provided by organizations in the public sector should not necessarily be free of
charge and subsidized. If an entity owned by the government, was established, however, with a
view not of providing socially important services, but rather generating profits, then such entity
is not a government agency, but a commercial enterprise, albeit falling under the public sector.
At the same time, public institutions should not necessarily be loss-making. Indeed, they may
be financially viable and generate planned profits, provided it falls in with performance of such
socially important functions for which they have been established. However, profit making
should not be the goal of government agencies. With some institutions the state nature of their
activities (for example, registration chambers) or special importance of such institutions for the
nation’s image, or their special role as highly hazardous sites (it is unlikely that we will be able
to list all options, since the decision on according the government agency status to an entity
may be taken both for an entire class of institutions and for individual institutions on a case-by-
case basis). The fact that government agencies raise planned profits from their activities (with
such profits used for the development of agencies themselves) does not turn such activities
into commercial or business-like activities. Payment which public institutions collect for
their services should be treated as a sort of tax which is earmarked and set at a level that would
ensure sufficient proceeds for performance of this specific socially important function and for
extended reproduction of the same. Essentially, the same would apply to all conventional taxes
– they should be set at such a level, that would ensure sufficient proceeds not only for
maintaining but for expanding the public sector.
Thus, profit making in itself does not turn activities of a government agency into
commercial activities. In any case, core operations of government institutions, even if
carried out for remuneration, should not be classified under commercial or business
category, due to the fact, amongst others, that the government authority that established the
institution must control prices for its services.   .
Another issue is whether a public institution may engage in non-core and other
activities that generate waterfall profits? The answer to this question should be negative. If
some activities yield high returns as per commercial standards, then such activities should be
left to the private sector, otherwise the dual role of the power body, which, on the one hand,
sets the market rules (control functions), while, on the other hand, acts in this market as a
business entity (business function), will   inevitably result in a conflict of interest. The main
goal of government and control bodies is not to earn money from commercial operations,
but provide services financed by taxes that they should charge, i.e. they must create such
investment, financial etc. environment which would allow taxpayers to normally exist and pay
taxes. Any reservations about giving power bodies an opportunity to earn money so that they
can invest proceeds into profitable businesses (raising additional revenues) till such time when
they accumulate sufficient funds, will not hold water, but do spawn corruption, prompt chase
after money for money’s sake and creation of exclusive conditions for “selected” entities by
restricting competition and establishing “artificial” monopolies. We believe that this should be
the answer to the foregoing question. 
Government bodies and public institutions, as a rule, should not engage in any non-core
activities, because the only possible underlying reason for their interest in any such activities is
high profit associated therewith. Moreover, government entities and public institutions should
not target at high profits even when pursuing their core activities. Prices for their services
should be established on the cost-plus basis (for services of monopoly nature) or at the market
price level, with such rule to apply to any services provided by government agencies for a fee.
A portion of such price may be subsidized by the budget although not on a mandatory basis.
(Apparently, the only instance when a government entity is entitled to rip waterfall profits from
its activities is when such activities are designed to restrict consumption of something
undesirable, i.e. represent a penalty). 
Types of government agencies 
As has already been discussed earlier, government agencies may include institutions, that are
prohibited to raise any extra-budgetary revenues, although the majority of government agencies
should be allowed to provide their services for remuneration. Attributing an agency to a
particular type should be on the basis of functions it performs. 
The state has certain obligations to provide certain vital services. These services must
be provided to everyone. Such services may be free of charge due to either impracticability or
inefficiency of charging a fee (for example, provision of services in the area of control,
activities of judicial bodies, national security, etc.), or due to necessity of providing social
guarantees stipulated by the Constitution. Whatever is above the said minimum may and
should be provided for payment, in which case the state shall only guarantee availability of a
service in the market, and not the provision thereof. Prices for budgetary services should be
restricted only if there is another kind of obligation, i.e. guarantee of accessibility of any
such service.
Thus, the following classification is suggested for government agencies:
The first type of government agencies includes institutions that are prohibited to
have and use extra-budgetary revenues and accounts. Such institutions should include
institutions, which were established for the purposes of government control, national
security and defense, law enforcement, as well as institutions of the judiciary system,
prosecution, and penitentiary system. The main criteria for classifying institutions under this
type should be their functions of government control, judiciary power, law enforcement, and
national security. Revenues that any such institutions may receive from extra-budgetary
sources  - proceeds from lease-out of assets which are temporarily out of use, various charges,
earmarked proceeds, charity contributions, etc. – all flow to the budget with no linkage to
expenditures of specific institutions. For any such institutions, the law should provide direct
ban on opening accounts for accounting of extra-budgetary revenues. Budgetary financing
should be the only source of revenues for such institutions (direct budgetary [smetnoye]
financing), and they should have a guarantee of budgetary immunity. 
The majority of other government agencies (the second type agencies) – social
protection institutions, healthcare institutions, scientific, cultural institutions, etc. – may have
extra-budgetary revenues and accounts for accounting of extra-budgetary revenues, where
charges for services, sponsors’ aid, grants, charity contributions, etc. should be credited to. All
extra-budgetary revenues and expenditures of such institutions should be posted to personal
accounts for extra-budgetary funds open with federal treasury branches. Depending on the
institution (or type thereof) there may be an option to use one account for all revenues of the
institution (both direct budgetary [smetnoye] financing proceeds and extra-budgetary revenues)
and a single budget (smeta) to account for all revenues. The same should be the case for funds
received by a government agency from budgets of other levels or state non-budgetary funds.
For accounting purposes all these receipts should be treated as extra-budgetary revenues.
Budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues should be reflected in the single balance sheet of an
agency.
Subsidiary liability of the government should be maintained with regard to liabilities of
second type government agencies. In our view, all institutions of the second type should apply
for a compulsory accreditation with and obtain approval for starting the above-mentioned
accounts from a relevant ministry (science, education, healthcare), and their charters should be
registered with the Ministry for Property Relations of the Russian Federation. For government
agencies that are authorized to raise extra-budgetary revenues, all restrictions on the amount of
services provided for remuneration and other extra-budgetary revenues should be lifted (to the
extent that any such services are their core activities). However, restrictions may be imposed
on the amount of revenues generated from such activities (provided that the surplus will be
transferred to the budget), and the charter of any such institution should contain a full and
sufficient list of extra-budgetary activities thereof. The law also should expressly ban any
intermediary and business activities, unless these are associated with the core activity of the
agency. The criterion of association in this case should not be the purpose of use of any such
funds (for example, acquisition of equipment, payment of wages, overhaul of premises, etc.),
but the source of funds  (exclusively, the activity for which the institution was set up).
In our view the criteria for classifying institutions under the first or second type (or a
specific list of government agencies of the first and second types) should be included in the
Government’s regulation of the system of government agencies in the Russian Federation.
Procedures for making of the budget (smeta), budget (smeta) format for extra-budgetary
revenues, flow pattern for extra-budgetary funds, uniform taxation and exemption rules should
be developed (updated) for the second type of government agencies, with relevant amendments
to be made to the budgetary classification.
All other government agencies that currently raise significant extra-budgetary
revenues from non-core activities or such institutions whose core activities upon closer
examination may be excluded (by a decision of the government or legislative assembly)
from the list of budgetary services, should be at some later stage deprived of their
government agency status and reorganized into any other legal structure.  It could be a
fund, non-profit organization, unitary enterprise, joint-stock company, etc. Accordingly, such
entities should maintain their accounts and file their reports in accordance with applicable laws
for entities, which are not government agencies. The government should not be liable for
obligations of such entities. They may receive budgetary funds in accordance with the general
rules of bidding for funds for government purchases. Those entities should open separate
accounts with commercial banks for separate accounting of budgetary funds.
Naturally, should this new treatment of government agencies be approved, not only the
status of the existing government agencies will have to be reviewed (some of them will retain
it, while others will lose it immediately or after some time), but the definition of government
unitary (state, etc.) entities and organizations will have to be clarified, and full-scale
stocktaking of such entities and organizations should be undertaken (or completed, if such
exercise is already under way). One will also have to decide on the status of some government
enterprises, with some of them to be possibly transferred to the government agency category
(See Box 4). Whether an enterprise or organization that provides socially important services
makes profit or loss should be in no case regarded as a criterion for classifying such an
organization as an enterprise or agency. Say, a private company may be organized for
performance of a socially important function (for example, construction of an airfield) and it
will operate under a government contract on a break-even basis, while remaining a private
sector entity. We assume that the main criterion for including an agency that raises extra-
budgetary revenues to the government agency category should be willingness of the
government (state) to assume subsidiary liability for its obligations. More or less clear-cut
criteria are unlikely to be applicable for this purpose. A decision on the issue, whatever it may
be, will probably be governed by political, rather than economic considerations. 
Box 4
Boundaries of public finance sector and accounting issues of extra-budgetary funds: a case study
on the Ministry of Railways and Ministry of Defense
Any analysis of collection and use of extra-budgetary funds by bodies of power and
government and government agencies is impeded by absence of any clear-cut boundaries between
public (state) and corporate finance in applicable legislation. Such situation, in particular, prevails in the
sectors where a significant portion of enterprises has not been privatized and ministries and departments
have retained a significant clout with enterprises falling under their jurisdiction. Thus, within the system
of the Ministry of Railways one will find not only extra-budgetary funds which are accounted for and
the use of which is analyzed by the Main Department of the Federal Treasury (ГУФК) of the Ministry
of Finance, but also those extra-budgetary funds where cash flows are not transparent for the Ministry
of Finance and may be assessed only by special audits of relevant control bodies.  
According to reports filed with the federal treasury authorities by government agencies and
organizations within the system of the Ministry of Railways, the amount of receipts for 2000 on
personal accounts maintained for accounting of extra-budgetary funds of the Ministry of Railways and
the foregoing institutions and organizations totaled RUR6.98 bn (of which RUR6.86 bn were spent).
At the same time, in accordance with the report produced by the Accounting Chamber, in 2000
the Ministry of Railways managed assets of a number of earmarked extra-budgetary funds which had
accounts with Transcreditbank (a commercial bank), including:  
− the fund for support of educational institutions (in the system of the Ministry of
Railways) (1.5% of the total before-tax profits of enterprises in the sector);
− the fund for support of central healthcare institutions (in the system of the Ministry of
Railways) (1% of before-tax profits);
− the fund for international operations (1% of before-tax profits)
− the fund for investment projects of sector-wide scale (36,6% )
− the financial reserve fund (5% ).
According to the information of the Accounting Chamber, overall in 2000 the earmarked funds
of the Ministry of Railways “illegally consolidated” for the purpose of “maintaining the sector
infrastructure” amounted to 100% of depreciation charges and about 45% of before-tax profit of
railroad sector enterprises, or RUR52.8 bn. Thus, extra-budgetary funds kept on accounts with the
federal treasury authorities amount to a mere 11.5% of total extra-budgetary cash available to the
Ministry of Railways, its enterprises and organizations.  
This situation is typical of not only the Ministry of Railways which is evidenced by the
interview with S.Ivanov, the Minister of Defense, published in Izvestia, where the Minister is quoted as
saying: “Sometimes we ourselves do not know exactly how much of extra-budgetary funds we have.
(…) such funds are oftentimes used inefficiently and insufficiently. Take, for example, proceeds from
salvaging. Before we sometimes picked out “raisins from the bun”, i.e. extracted and sold precious
metals, while the rest was just thrown away. Now we are going to do full-scale salvaging. Under the
Ministry of Defense we have the Central Department of Material Resources, which will take care of this
issue. All proceeds will be consolidated and thereafter appropriation decisions will be taken jointly with
Commanders-in-chief of all Arms depending on the needs and priorities of the Armed Forces”. 
Source: Vedomosty 27.06.2001, Izvestia 25.06.2001.
Proposals and Recommendations
Our consultants have proposed the following priority steps to be taken in implementing
the Concept of reforming accounting of extra-budgetary revenues of government agencies:
1. Finalize the establishment of the system of federal government agencies based on
the results of stock-taking of the existing government agencies, enterprises and organizations
with currently existing government agencies to be transformed into one of the following
categories: (a) state bodies of power and public institutions not entitled to receive and use
extra-budgetary revenues for their own needs or open accounts for accounting of the same; (b)
government agencies that are given the right to receive and use extra-budgetary revenues for
their own needs and open accounts for accounting of the same; (c) other public and private
enterprises and organizations that are entitled to budget appropriations in accordance with the
current legislation. For a government agency to be included in the category of government
agencies a founder/owner shall admit subsidiary liability for agency’s obligations. State
organ’s decision on admitting such liability in case of creditors lodging claims against a
government agency shall be set out in its foundation documents. Whether an organization is or
is not in need of a direct government financing shall not be taken into account in deciding on
whether or not it should be accorded a status of a government agency, since government
services may as well be provided by profit organizations under a contract with bodies of power
(on a contractual basis). The status of a government agency and name of a founding
government organ together with a complete list of authorized activities should be specified in
the foundation documents.
2. Finalize the division of revenues generated from the use of property between levels
of the fiscal system based on how property is divided between the levels of power and
government. Ensure that revenues arising from use of federal property are accounted for in
full in the federal budget.
3. Integrate extra-budgetary receipts in the fiscal system and regular budget
process. Consolidated (sector) budgets (smetas) should be considered and approved in the
course of adoption of the Law on the federal budget while consolidated reports of general
managers (on subordinate institutions) and spending agencies receiving funds directly from the
federal budget (on the use of extra-budgetary receipts) should be approved as part of the report
on federal budget execution for a particular year. Government agencies should have the right to
use extra-budgetary revenues only within the limits of the smeta approved by a budget resource
manager. Control over compliance with the smeta should be the responsibility of Treasury
organs. 
4. Finalize transfer of all accounts of government agencies to the Federal
Treasury for accounting of extra-budgetary receipts.
5. In view of specific conditions of the sector general managers of budget resources
should:
- Determine and set out in foundation documents of government agencies the
procedure for making budgets (smetas) for accounting of extra-budgetary
receipts;
- Determine and stipulate limits on extra-budgetary revenues.
6. The following restrictions should apply to government agencies:
- A government agency shall not have the right to borrow funds (except for loans
provided by the founder);
- A government agency shall not have the right to engage in entrepreneurial
activities, defined in the Civil Code as activities undertaken at one’s risk, since its
founder bears subsidiary liability for its obligations;
- Government agency’s budget shall be approved and controlled by the general
manager/founder. Unintended use (not provided for in the budget) of extra-
budgetary receipts involves administrative punishment provided for in the
foundation documents of government agencies and/or CEO labor contracts.
7. State property shall be transferred to and kept in the books of a government agency
for it to be able to carry out its charter activities. In the event of liquidation (or change of an
ownership or legal form) of a government agency state property shall be transferred back to the
books of the Ministry of Property (founder).  
8. Assets acquired by a government agency out of its extra-budgetary revenues
shall belong to its founder (government) and be accounted for as part of the assets
(transferred to the books) of the government agency.
9. Tax benefits should be granted to organizations regardless of their ownership and
legal form, depending on types of their activities.
10. For Treasury organs to be able to control compliance with the budget and prevent
separate budget items as well as the total budget of an agency from exceeding established
appropriations, the expenditure accounting practices of government agencies will have to be
changed by making changes in the chart of accounts for government agencies. The proposed
changes should provide for a phased spending process and reduction of a free balance of
appropriations in cases where an organization undertakes payment commitments (concludes
contracts and agreements, including labor contracts). In other words, the current accounting
system should be supplemented with elements of accounting on an accrual basis. 
11. Deprive public institutions of the right to lease state property (redundant
property) on a long-term basis. Allow institutions to lease state property (temporarily out of
use) only on a short-term basis. Long-term lease of property shall fall exclusively under the
jurisdiction of appropriate committees for state property management and awarded through
bidding. Revenues arising from long-term lease of property should be consolidated in the
federal budget revenues without linkage to revenues of particular agencies.
